Education and research (Constitution of liberty)

 EDUCATION AND RESEARCH

A general State education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be

exactly like one another: and as the mould in which it casts them is that

which pleases the predominant power in the government, whether this be a

monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the existing gener-

ation; in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it establishes a despotism

over the mind, leading by natural tendency to one over the body.

—John Stuart Mill

1. Knowledge is perhaps the chief good that can be had at a price, but those

who do not already possess it often cannot recognize its usefulness. More

important still, access to the sources of knowledge necessary for the working

of modern society presupposes the command of certain techniques—above

all, that of reading—which people must acquire before they can judge well for

themselves what will be useful to them. Though our case for freedom rests to

a great extent on the contention that competition is one of the most powerful

instruments for the dissemination of knowledge and that it will usually dem-

onstrate the value of knowledge to those who do not possess it, there is no

doubt that the utilization of knowledge can be greatly increased by deliberate

efforts. Ignorance is one of the chief reasons why men’s endeavors are often

not channeled so that they are most useful to their fellows; and there are vari-

ous reasons why it may be in the interest of the whole community that knowl-

edge be brought to people who have little incentive to seek it or to make some

sacrifi ce to acquire it. These reasons are particularly compelling in the case of

children, but some of the arguments apply no less to adults.

With regard to children the important fact is, of course, that they are not

responsible individuals to whom the argument for freedom fully applies.

Though it is generally in the best interest of children that their bodily and

mental welfare be left in the care of their parents or guardians, this does not

mean that parents should have unrestricted liberty to treat their children as

they like. The other members of the community have a genuine stake in the

welfare of the children. The case for requiring parents or guardians to pro-

vide for those under their care a certain minimum of education is clearly very

strong. 1

In contemporary society, the case for compulsory education up to a cer-

tain minimum standard is twofold. There is the general argument that all of

us will be exposed to fewer risks and will receive more benefi ts from our fel-

lows if they share with us certain basic knowledge and beliefs. And in a coun-

try with democratic institutions there is the further important consideration

that democracy is not likely to work, except on the smallest local scale, with a

partly illiterate people. 2

It is important to recognize that general education is not solely, and per-

haps not even mainly, a matter of communicating knowledge. There is a

need for certain common standards of values, and, though too great empha-

sis on this need may lead to very illiberal consequences, peaceful common

existence would be clearly impossible without any such standards. If in long-

settled communities with a predominantly indigenous population, this is not

likely to be a serious problem, there are instances, such as the United States

during the period of large immigration, where it may well be one. That the

United States would not have become such an effective “melting pot” and

would probably have faced extremely difficult problems if it had not been for

a deliberate policy of “Americanization” through the public school system

seems fairly certain.

The fact that all education must be and ought to be guided by defi nite

values is, however, also the source of real dangers in any system of public edu-

cation. One has to admit that in this respect most nineteenth- century liber-

als were guided by a naïve overconfi dence in what mere communication of

knowledge could achieve. In their rationalistic liberalism they often presented

the case for general education as though the dispersion of knowledge would

solve all major problems and as though it were necessary only to convey to

the masses that little extra knowledge which the educated already possessed

in order that this “conquest of ignorance” should initiate a new era. There

is not much reason to believe that, if at any one time the best knowledge

which some possess were made available to all, the result would be a much

better society. Knowledge and ignorance are very relative concepts, and there

is little evidence that the difference in knowledge which at any one time exists

between the more and the less educated of a society can have such a decisive

infl uence on its character.

2. If we accept the general argument for compulsory education, there

remain these chief problems: How is this education to be provided? How

much of it is to be provided for all? How are those who are to be given more

to be selected and at whose expense? It is probably a necessary consequence

of the adoption of compulsory education that for those families to whom

the cost would be a severe burden it should be defrayed out of public funds.

There is still the question, however, how much education should be provided

at public expense and in what manner it should be provided. It is true that,

historically, compulsory education was usually preceded by the governments’

increasing opportunities by providing state schools. The earliest experiments

with making education compulsory, those in Prussia at the beginning of the

eighteenth century, were in fact confi ned to those districts where the govern-

ment had provided schools. There can be little doubt that in this manner the

process of making education general was greatly facilitated. Imposing general

education on a people largely unfamiliar with its institutions and advantages

would indeed be difficult. This does not mean, however, that compulsory edu-

cation or even government- fi nanced general education today requires the

educational institutions to be run by the government.

It is a curious fact that one of the fi rst effective systems under which com-

pulsory education was combined with the provision of most educational insti-

tutions by the government was created by one of the great advocates of indi-

vidual liberty, Wilhelm von Humboldt, only fi fteen years after he had argued

that public education was harmful because it prevented variety in accomplish-

ments and unnecessary because in a free nation there would be no lack of

educational institutions. “Education,” he had said, “seems to me to lie wholly

beyond the limits within which political agency should be properly confi ned.” 3

It was the plight of Prussia during the Napoleonic wars and the needs of na-

tional defense that made him abandon his earlier position. The desire for “the

development of the individual personalities in their greatest variety” which

had inspired his earlier work became secondary when desire for a strong orga-

nized state led him to devote much of his later life to the building of a sys-

tem of state education that became a model for the rest of the world. It can

scarcely be denied that the general level of education which Prussia thus

attained was one of the chief causes of her rapid economic rise and later

that of all Germany. One may well ask, however, whether this success was not

bought at too high a price. The role played by Prussia during the succeeding

generations may make one doubt whether the much lauded Prussian school-

master was an unmixed blessing for the world, or even for Prussia.

The very magnitude of the power over men’s minds that a highly central-

ized and government- dominated system of education places in the hands of

the authorities ought to make one hesitate before accepting it too readily. Up

to a point, the arguments that justify compulsory education also require that

government should prescribe some of the content of this education. As we

have already mentioned, there may be circumstances in which the case for

authority’s providing a common cultural background for all citizens becomes

very strong. Yet we must remember that it is the provision of education by

government which creates such problems as that of the segregation of

Negroes in the United States—difficult problems of ethnic or religious minor-

ities which are bound to arise where government takes control of the chief

instruments of transmitting culture. In multinational states the problem of

who is to control the school system tends to become the chief source of fric-

tion between nationalities. To one who has seen this happen in countries like

the old Austria- Hungary, there is much force in the argument that it may be

better even that some children should go without formal education than that

they should be killed in fi ghting over who is to control that education. 4

Even in ethnically homogeneous states, however, there are strong argu-

ments against entrusting to government that degree of control of the contents

of education which it will possess if it directly manages most of the schools

that are accessible to the great masses. Even if education were a science which

provided us with the best of methods of achieving certain goals, we could

hardly wish the latest methods to be applied universally and to the complete

exclusion of others—still less that the aims should be uniform. Very few of

the problems of education, however, are scientifi c questions in the sense that

they can be decided by any objective tests. They are mostly either outright

questions of value, or at least the kind of questions concerning which the only

ground for trusting the judgment of some people rather than that of others

is that the former have shown more good sense in other respects. Indeed,

the very possibility that, with a system of government education, all elemen-

tary education may come to be dominated by the theories of a particular

group who genuinely believe that they have scientifi c answers to those prob-

lems (as has happened to a large extent in the United States during the last

thirty years) should be sufficient to warn us of the risks involved in subjecting

the whole educational system to central direction.

3. In fact, the more highly one rates the power that education can have over

men’s minds, the more convinced one should be of the danger of placing this

power in the hands of any single authority. But even if one does not rate its

power to do good as highly as did some of the rationalistic liberals of the nine-

teenth century, however, the mere recognition of this power should lead us to

conclusions almost the opposite of theirs. And if, at present, one of the rea-

sons why there should be the greatest variety of educational opportunities is

that we really know so little about what different educational techniques may

achieve, the argument for variety would be even stronger if we knew more

about the methods of producing certain types of results—as we soon may.

In the fi eld of education perhaps more than in any other, the greatest

dangers to freedom are likely to come from the development of psycholog-

ical techniques which may soon give us far greater power than we ever had

to shape men’s minds deliberately. But knowledge of what we can make of

human beings if we can control the essential conditions of their develop-

ment, though it will offer a frightful temptation, does not necessarily mean

that we shall by its use improve upon the human being who has been allowed

to develop freely. It is by no means clear that it would be a gain if we could

produce the human types that it was generally thought we needed. It is not

at all unlikely that the great problem in this fi eld will soon be that of prevent-

ing the use of powers which we do possess and which may present a strong

temptation to all those who regard a controlled result as invariably superior

to an uncontrolled one. Indeed, we may soon fi nd that the solution has to lie

in government ceasing to be the chief dispenser of education and becoming

the impartial protector of the individual against all uses of such newly found

powers.

Not only is the case against the management of schools by government now

stronger than ever, but most of the reasons which in the past could have been

advanced in its favor have disappeared. Whatever may have been true then,

there can be little doubt that today, with the traditions and institutions of uni-

versal education fi rmly established and with modern transportation solving

most of the difficulties of distance, it is no longer necessary that education be

not only fi nanced but also provided by government.

As has been shown by Professor Milton Friedman, 5 it would now be entirely

practicable to defray the costs of general education out of the public purse

without maintaining government schools, by giving the parents vouchers

covering the cost of education of each child which they could hand over to

schools of their choice. It may still be desirable that government directly pro-

vide schools in a few isolated communities where the number of children is

too small (and the average cost of education therefore too high) for privately

run schools. But with respect to the great majority of the population, it would

undoubtedly be possible to leave the organization and management of educa-

tion entirely to private efforts, with the government providing merely the basic

fi nance and ensuring a minimum standard for all schools where the vouchers

could be spent. Another great advantage of this plan is that parents would no

longer be faced with the alternative of having to accept whatever education

the government provides or of paying the entire cost of a different and slightly

more expensive education themselves; and if they should choose a school out

of the common run, they would be required to pay only the additional cost.

4. A more difficult problem is how much education is to be provided at

public expense and for whom such education is to be provided beyond the

minimum assured to all. It can hardly be doubted that the number of those

whose contribution to the common needs will be increased by education

extended beyond a certain stage sufficiently to justify the cost will always be

only a small proportion of the total population. Also, it is probably undeni-

able that we have no certain methods of ascertaining beforehand who among

the young people will derive the greatest benefi t from an advanced educa-

tion. Moreover, whatever we do, it seems inevitable that many of those who

get an advanced education will later enjoy material advantages over their fel-

lows only because someone else felt it worthwhile to invest more in their edu-

cation, and not because of any greater natural capacity or greater effort on

their part.

We shall not stop to consider how much education is to be provided for all

or how long all children should be required to attend school. The answer must

depend in part on particular circumstances, such as the general wealth of the

community, the character of its economy, and perhaps even climatic condi-

tions affecting the age of adolescence. In wealthier communities the problem

usually is no longer one of what schooling will increase economic efficiency

but rather one of how to occupy children, until they are allowed to earn a liv-

ing, in a manner that will later assist them in better using their leisure.

The really important issue is that of the manner in which those whose edu-

cation is to be prolonged beyond the general minimum are to be selected. The

costs of a prolonged education, in terms of material resources and still more

of human ones, are so considerable even for a rich country that the desire to

give a large fraction of the population an advanced education will always in

some degree confl ict with the desire to prolong the education for all. It also

seems probable that a society that wishes to get a maximum economic return

from a limited expenditure on education should concentrate on the higher

education of a comparatively small elite, 6 which today would mean increas-

ing that part of the population getting the most advanced type of education

rather than prolonging education for large numbers. Yet, with government

education, this would not seem practicable in a democracy, nor would it be

desirable that authority should determine who is to get such an education.

As in all other fi elds, the case for subsidization of higher education (and of

research) must rest not on the benefi t it confers on the recipient but on the

resulting advantages for the community at large. There is, therefore, little case

for subsidizing any kind of vocational training, where the greater profi ciency

acquired will be refl ected in greater earning power, which will constitute a

fairly adequate measure of the desirability of investing in training of this kind.

Much of the increased earnings in occupations requiring such training will be

merely a return on the capital invested in it. The best solution would seem to

be that those in whom such investment would appear to promise the largest

return should be enabled to borrow the capital and later repay it out of their

increased earnings, though such an arrangement would meet with consider-

able practical difficulties. 7

The situation is somewhat different, however, where the costs of a higher

education are not likely to result in a corresponding increase in the price at

which the services of the better- trained man can be sold to other individuals

(as is the case in the professions of medicine, the law, engineering, and so on)

but where the aim is the further dispersion and increase in knowledge through-

out the community at large. The benefi ts that a community receives from its

scientists and scholars cannot be measured by the price at which these men

can sell particular services, since much of their contribution becomes freely

available to all. There is therefore a strong case for assisting at least some of

those who show promise and inclination for the pursuit of such studies.

It is a different matter, however, to assume that all who are intellectually

capable of acquiring a higher education have a claim to it. That it is in the

general interest to enable all the specially intelligent to become learned is

by no means evident or that all of them would materially profi t by such an

advanced education, or even that such an education should be restricted to

those who have an unquestionable capacity for it and be made the normal

or perhaps the exclusive path to higher positions. As has been pointed out

recently, a much sharper division between classes might come to exist, and

the less fortunate might become seriously neglected, if all the more intelli-

gent were deliberately and successfully brought into the wealthy group and it

became not only a general presumption but a universal fact that the relatively

poor were less intelligent. There is also another problem which has assumed

serious proportions in some European countries and which we ought to keep

in mind, and this is the problem of having more intellectuals than we can

profi tably employ. There are few greater dangers to political stability than the

existence of an intellectual proletariat who fi nd no outlet for their learning.

The general problem we are faced with in all higher education, then, is this:

by some method, certain young people must be selected, at an age when one

cannot know with any certainty who will profi t most, to be given an educa-

tion that will enable them to earn a higher income than the rest; and to justify

the investment, they must be selected so that, on the whole, they will be quali-

fi ed to earn a higher income. Finally, we have to accept the fact that, since as a

rule somebody else will have to pay for the education, those who benefi t from

it will thus be enjoying an “unearned” advantage.

5. In recent times the difficulties of this problem have been greatly increased

and a reasonable solution made almost impossible by the increasing use of

government education as an instrument for egalitarian aims. Though a case

can be made for assuring opportunities for an advanced education as far as

possible to those most likely to profi t from them, the control of government

over education has in large measure been used to equalize the prospects of all,

which is something very different. Though egalitarians usually protest against

the imputation that their goal is any sort of mechanical equality which would

deprive some people of advantages which cannot be provided for all, there is

in education a clear indication that such is the tendency. This egalitarian stand

is usually not so explicitly argued as in R. H. Tawney’s Equality, in which infl u-

ential tract the author contends that it would be unjust “to spend less liber-

ally on the education of the slow than on that of the intelligent.” 8 But to some

extent the two confl icting desires of equalizing opportunity and of adjusting

opportunity to capacity (which, as we know, has little to do with merit in any

moral sense) have become everywhere confused.

It should be admitted that, so far as education at public expense is con-

cerned, the argument for equal treatment of all is strong. When it is com-

bined, however, with an argument against permitting any special advantages

to the more fortunate ones, it means in effect that all must be given what any

child gets and that none should have what cannot be provided for all. Consis-

tently pursued, it would mean that no more must be spent on the education of

any child than can be spent on the education of every child. If this were the

necessary consequence of public education, it would constitute a strong argu-

ment against government’s concerning itself with education beyond the ele-

mentary level, which can indeed be given to all, and for leaving all advanced

education in private hands.

At any rate, the fact that certain advantages must be limited to some does

not mean that a single authority should have exclusive power to decide to

whom they should go. It is not likely that such power in the hands of author-

ity would in the long run really advance education or that it would create

social conditions that would be felt to be more satisfactory or just than they

would otherwise have been. On the fi rst point it should be clear that no single

authority should have the monopoly of judging how valuable a particular

kind of education is and how much should be invested in more education or

in which of the different kinds of education. There is not—and cannot be

in a free society—a single standard by which we can decide on the relative

importance of different aims or the relative desirability of different methods.

Perhaps in no other fi eld is the continued availability of alternative ways as

important as in that of education, where the task is to prepare young people

for an ever changing world.

So far as justice is concerned, we should be clear that those who in the

general interest most “deserve” an advanced education are not necessarily

those who by effort and sacrifi ce have earned the greatest subjective merit.

Natural capacity and inborn aptitude are as much “unfair advantages” as

accidents of environment, and to confi ne the advantages of higher education

to those that we can confi dently foresee profi ting most from them will neces-

sarily increase rather than decrease the discrepancy between economic status

and subjective merit.

The desire to eliminate the effects of accident, which lies at the root of the

demand for “social justice,” can be satisfi ed in the fi eld of education, as else-

where, only by eliminating all those opportunities which are not subject to

deliberate control. But the growth of civilization rests largely on the individ-

uals’ making the best use of whatever accidents they encounter, of the essen-

tially unpredictable advantages that one kind of knowledge will in new cir-

cumstances confer on one individual over others.

However commendable may be the motives of those who fervently desire

that, in the interest of justice, all should be made to start with the same

chances, theirs is an ideal that is literally impossible to realize. Furthermore,

any pretense that it has been achieved or even closely approached can only

make matters worse for the less successful. Though there is every case for

removing whatever special obstacles existing institutions may put in the way

of some, it is neither possible nor desirable to make all start with the same

chances, since this can be achieved only by depriving some of possibilities

that cannot be provided for all. While we wish everybody’s opportunities to

be as great as possible, we should certainly decrease those of most if we were

507THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY

to prevent them from being any greater than those of the least fortunate. To

say that all who live at the same time in any given country should start at the

same place is no more reconcilable with a developing civilization than to say

that this kind of equality should be assured to people living at different times

or at different places.

It may be in the interest of the community that some who show exceptional

capacities for scholarly or scientifi c pursuits should be given an opportunity to

follow them irrespective of family means. But this does not confer a right on

anyone to such opportunity; nor does it mean that only those whose excep-

tional capacities can be ascertained ought to have the opportunity or that

nobody should have it unless it can be assured to all who can pass the same

objective tests.

Not all the qualities which enable one to make special contributions are

ascertainable by examinations or tests, and it is more important that at least

some of those who possess such qualities have an opportunity than that it be

given to all who satisfy the same requirements. A passionate desire for knowl-

edge or an unusual combination of interests may be more important than

the more visible gifts or any testable capacities; and a background of general

knowledge and interests or a high esteem for knowledge produced by family

environment often contributes more to achievement than natural capacity.

That there are some people who enjoy the advantages of a favorable home

atmosphere is an asset to society which egalitarian policies can destroy but

which cannot be utilized without the appearance of unmerited inequalities.

And since a desire for knowledge is a bent that is likely to be transmitted

through the family, there is a strong case for enabling parents who greatly care

for education to secure it for their children by a material sacrifi ce, even if on

other grounds these children may appear less deserving than others who will

not get it. 9

6. The insistence that education should be given only to those of proved

capacity produces a situation in which the whole population is graded accord-

ing to some objective test and in which one set of opinions as to what kind of

person qualifi es for the benefi ts of an advanced education prevails through-

out. This means an official ranking of people into a hierarchy, with the cer-

tifi ed genius on top and the certifi ed moron at the bottom, a hierarchy made

much worse by the fact that it is presumed to express “merit” and will deter-

mine access to the opportunities in which value can show itself. Where exclu-

sive reliance on a system of government education is intended to serve “social

justice,” a single view of what constitutes an advanced education—and then

of the capacities which qualify for it—will apply throughout, and the fact that

somebody has received an advanced education will be presumed to indicate

that he had “deserved” it.

In education, as in other fi elds, the admitted fact that the public has an

interest in assisting some must not be taken to mean that only those who are

judged by some agreed view to deserve assistance out of public funds should

be allowed access to an advanced education, or that nobody should be allowed

to assist specifi c individuals on other grounds. There is probably much to be

said for some members of each of the different groups of the population

being given a chance, even if the best from some groups seem less qualifi ed

than members of other groups who do not get it. For this reason, different

local, religious, occupational, or ethnic groups should be able to assist some of

the young members, so that those who receive a higher education will repre-

sent their respective group somewhat in proportion to the esteem in which the

latter hold education.

It must at least seem doubtful that a society in which educational oppor-

tunities were universally awarded according to presumed capacity would be

more tolerable for the unsuccessful ones than one in which accidents of birth

admittedly played a great role. In Britain, where the postwar reform of edu-

cation has gone a long way toward establishing a system based on presumed

capacity, the consequences already cause concern. A recent study of social

mobility suggests that it now “will be the grammar schools which will furnish

the new elite, an elite apparently much less assailable because it is selected for

‘measured intelligence.’ The selection process will tend to reinforce the pres-

tige of occupations already high in social status and to divide the population

into streams which many may come to regard, indeed already regard, as dis-

tinct as sheep and goats. Not to have been to a grammar school will be a more

serious disqualifi cation than in the past, when social inequality in the educa-

tional system was known to exist. And the feeling of resentment may become

more rather than less acute just because the individual concerned realizes that

there is some validity in the selection process which has kept him out of gram-

mar school. In this respect apparent justice may be more difficult to bear than

injustice.” 10 Or, as another British writer has observed more generally, “it is

one unexpected result of the Welfare State that it should make the social pat-

tern not less rigid but more so.” 11

Let us by all means endeavor to increase opportunities for all. But we

ought to do so in the full knowledge that to increase opportunities for all is

likely to favor those better able to take advantage of them and may often at

fi rst increase inequalities. Where the demand for “equality of opportunity”

leads to attempts to eliminate such “unfair advantages,” it is only likely to do

harm. All human differences, whether they are differences in natural gifts or

in opportunities, create unfair advantages. But, since the chief contribution of

any individual is to make the best use of the accidents he encounters, success

must to a great extent be a matter of chance.

7. On the highest level the dissemination of knowledge by instruction

becomes inseparable from the advance of knowledge by research. The intro-

duction to those problems which are on the boundaries of knowledge can be

given only by men whose main occupation is research. During the nineteenth

century the universities, particularly those on the European Continent, in fact

developed into institutions which, at their best, provided education as a by-

product of research and where the student acquired knowledge by working as

an apprentice to the creative scientist or scholar. Since then, because of the

increased amount of knowledge that must be mastered before the boundaries

of knowledge are reached, and because of the increasing numbers receiving

a university education without any intention of ever reaching that stage, the

character of the universities has greatly changed. The greater part of what

is still called “university work” is today in character and substance merely a

continuation of school instruction. Only the “graduate” or “postgraduate”

schools—in fact, only the best of these—are still mainly devoted to the kind

of work that characterized the Continental universities of the last century.

There is no reason to think, however, that we are not as much in need of the

more advanced type of work. It is still this kind of work on which the general

level of the intellectual life of a country chiefl y depends. And while in the

experimental sciences research institutes in which the young scientists serve

their apprenticeship are in some measure fulfi lling this need, there is dan-

ger that in some fi elds of scholarship the democratic broadening of educa-

tion may be detrimental to the pursuit of that original work that keeps knowl-

edge alive.

There is probably less cause for concern about the supposedly inadequate

number of university- trained specialists that are currently being produced

in the Western world 12 than about the inadequate output of men of really

top quality. And though, at least in the United States, and to an increasing

extent also elsewhere, the responsibility for this rests mainly with the inade-

quate preparation by the schools and with the utilitarian bias of institutions

concerned primarily with conferring professional qualifi cations, we must not

overlook the democratic preference for providing better material opportuni-

ties for large numbers over the advancement of knowledge, which will always

be the work of the relatively few and which indeed has the strongest claim for

public support.

The reason why it still seems probable that institutions like the old univer-

sities, devoted to research and teaching at the boundaries of knowledge, will

continue to remain the chief sources of new knowledge is that only such insti-

tutions can offer that freedom in the choice of problems and those contacts

between representatives of the different disciplines that provide the best con-

ditions for the conception and pursuit of new ideas. However greatly prog-

ress in a known direction may be accelerated by the deliberate organization

of work aiming at some known goal, the decisive and unforeseeable steps in

the general advance usually occur not in the pursuit of specifi c ends but in

the exploitation of those opportunities which the accidental combination of

particular knowledge and gifts and special circumstances and contacts have

placed in the way of some individual. Though the specialized research institu-

tion may be the most efficient for all tasks that are of an “applied” character,

such institutional research is always in some measure directed research, the

aim of which is determined by the specialized equipment, the particular team

assembled, and the concrete purpose to which the institution is dedicated. But

in “fundamental” research on the outskirts of knowledge there are often no

fi xed subjects or fi elds, and the decisive advances will frequently be due to the

disregard of the conventional division of disciplines.

8. The problem of supporting the advance of knowledge in the most effec-

tive manner is therefore closely connected with the issue of “academic free-

dom.” The conceptions for which this term stands were developed in the coun-

tries of the European Continent, where the universities were generally state

institutions; thus they were directed almost entirely against political interfer-

ence with the work of these institutions. 13 The real issue, however, is a much

wider one. There would be nearly as strong a case against any unitary plan-

ning and direction of all research by a senate composed of the most highly

reputed scientists and scholars as there is against such direction by more extra-

neous authorities. Though it is natural that the individual scientist should most

resent interference with his choice or pursuit of problems when it is motivated

by what to him seem irrelevant considerations, it might be still less harmful if

there were a multiplicity of such institutions, each subject to different outside

pressures, than if they were all under the unifi ed control of one single concep-

tion of what at a given moment was in the best scientifi c interest.

Academic freedom cannot mean, of course, that every scientist should

do what seems most desirable to him. Nor does it mean self- government of

science as a whole. It means rather that there should be as many independent

centers of work as possible, in which at least those men who have proved their

capacity to advance knowledge and their devotion to their task can themselves

determine the problems on which they are to spend their energies and where

they can expound the conclusions they have reached, whether or not these

conclusions are palatable to their employer or the public at large. 14

In practice, this means that those men who have already proved themselves

in the eyes of their peers, and who, for this reason, have been given senior

positions in which they can determine both their own work and that of their

juniors, should be given security of tenure. This is a privilege conferred for

reason similar to those which have made it desirable to make the position

of judges secure, and it is conferred not in the interest of the individual but

because it is rightly believed that persons in such positions will, on the whole,

serve the public interest best if they are protected against pressure from out-

side opinion. It is of course not an unlimited privilege, and it means merely

that, once it is granted, it cannot be withdrawn except for reasons specifi cally

provided for in the original appointment.

There is no reason why these terms should not be altered for new appoint-

ments as we gain new experience, though such new conditions cannot apply

to those who already possess what in the United States is called “tenure.” For

example, recent experience seems to suggest that the terms of appointment

should specify that the occupant of such a position forfeits the privilege if he

knowingly joins or supports any movement that is opposed to the very prin-

ciples on which this privilege rests. Tolerance should not include the advocacy

of intolerance. On this ground I feel that a Communist should not be given

“tenure,” though, once he has been given it without such explicit limitations, it

would have to be respected like any other similar appointment.

All this applies, however, only to the special privilege of “tenure.” Apart

from these considerations pertinent to tenure, there exists little justifi cation for

anyone claiming as a matter of right the freedom to do or teach what he likes

or, on the other hand, for any hard- and- fast rule stating that anyone holding a

particular opinion should be universally excluded. Though an institution aim-

ing at high standards will soon discover that it can attract fi rst- class talent only

if it grants even its youngest members a wide choice of pursuits and opinions,

no one has the right to be employed by an institution irrespective of the inter-

ests and views he holds.

9. The need for protecting institutions of learning against the cruder kind

of interference by political or economic interests is so well recognized today

that there is not much danger of its being successfully exercised in reputable

institutions. There is still need for watchfulness, especially in the social sci-

ences, where the pressure is often exercised in the name of highly idealistic

and widely approved aims. Pressure against an unpopular view is more harm-

ful than opposition to a popular one. It should certainly be a warning to us

that even Thomas Jefferson argued that in the fi eld of government the prin-

ciples taught and the texts to be followed in the University of Virginia should

be prescribed by authority, because the next professor might be “one of the

school of quondam federalism”! 15

Today the danger lies, however, not so much in obvious outside interference

as in the increased control which the growing fi nancial needs of research give

to those who hold the purse strings. It constitutes a real threat to the interests

of scientifi c advance because the ideal of a unifi ed and centralized direction

of all scientifi c efforts which it might be made to serve is shared by some of

the scientists themselves. Although the fi rst great attack which, in the name of

planning of science and under strong Marxist infl uence, was launched in the

1930s has been successfully repelled, 16 and the discussions to which it gave rise

have created a greater awareness of the importance of freedom in this fi eld, it

seems probable that the attempts to “organize” scientifi c effort and to direct it

to particular goals will reappear in new forms.

The conspicuous successes which the Russians have achieved in certain

fi elds and which are the cause of the renewed interest in the deliberate orga-

nization of scientifi c effort should not have surprised us and should give us no

reason for altering our opinion about the importance of freedom. That any

one goal, or any limited number of objectives, which are already known to be

achievable, are likely to be reached sooner if they are given priority in a cen-

tral allocation of all resources cannot be disputed. This is the reason why a

totalitarian organization is indeed likely to be more effective in a short war—

and why such a government is so dangerous to the others when it is in a posi-

tion to choose the most favorable moment for war. But this does not mean

that the advance of knowledge in general is likely to be faster if all efforts

are directed to what now seem the most important goals or that, in the long

run, the nation that has more deliberately organized its efforts will be the

stronger. 17

Another factor that has contributed to the belief in the superiority of

directed research is the somewhat exaggerated conception of the extent to

which modern industry owes its progress to the organized teamwork of the

great industrial laboratories. In fact, as has been shown recently in some

detail, 18 a much greater proportion than is generally believed even of the chief

technological advances of recent times has come from individual efforts, often

from men pursuing an amateur interest or who were led to their problems by

accident. And what appears to be true of the more applied fi elds is certainly

even more true of basic research, where the important advances are, by their

nature, more difficult to foresee. In this fi eld there may indeed be danger in

the current emphasis on teamwork and co- operation, and it may well be the

greater individualism of the European (which is partly owing to his being less

used to and therefore less dependent on ample material support) which still

seems to give him some advantage over the American scientist in the most

original sphere of fundamental research.

There is perhaps no more important application of our main theses than

that the advance of knowledge is likely to be fastest where scientifi c pursuits

are not determined by some unifi ed conception of their social utility, and

where each proved man can devote himself to the tasks in which he sees the

best chance of making a contribution. Where, as is increasingly the case in all

the experimental fi elds, this opportunity can no longer be given by assuring to

every qualifi ed student the possibility of deciding how to use his own time, but

where large material means are required for most kinds of work, the prospects

of advance would be most favorable if, instead of the control of funds being

in the hands of a single authority proceeding according to a unitary plan,

there were a multiplicity of independent sources so that even the unorthodox

thinker would have a chance of fi nding a sympathetic ear.

Though we still have much to learn about the best manner of managing in-

dependent funds devoted to the support of research and though it may not be

certain whether the infl uence of the very large foundations (with their inevi-

table dependence on majority opinion and consequent tendency to accentu-

ate the swings of scientifi c fashion) has always been as benefi cial as it might

have been, there can be little doubt that the multiplicity of private endow-

ments interested in limited fi elds is one of the most promising features of

the American situation. But though present tax laws may have temporarily

increased the fl ow of such funds, we should also remember that the same laws

make the accumulation of new fortunes more difficult, and that to that extent

these sources are likely to dry up in the future. As elsewhere, the preserva-

tion of freedom in the spheres of the mind and of the spirit will depend, in

the long run, on the dispersal of the control of the material means and on the

continued existence of individuals who are in a position to devote large funds

to purposes which seem important to them.

10. Nowhere is freedom more important than where our ignorance is great-

est—at the boundaries of knowledge, in other words, where nobody can pre-

dict what lies a step ahead. Though freedom has been threatened even there,

it is still the fi eld where we can count on most men rallying to its defense when

they recognize the threat. If in this book we have been concerned mainly with

freedom in other fi elds, it is because we so often forget today that intellectual

freedom rests on a much wider foundation of freedom and cannot exist with-

out it. But the ultimate aim of freedom is the enlargement of those capaci-

ties in which man surpasses his ancestors and to which each generation must

endeavor to add its share—its share in the growth of knowledge and the grad-

ual advance of moral and aesthetic beliefs, where no superior must be allowed

to enforce one set of views of what is right or good and where only further

experience can decide what should prevail.

It is wherever man reaches beyond his present self, where the new emerges

and assessment lies in the future, that liberty ultimately shows its value. The

problems of education and research have thus brought us back to the leading

theme of this book, from where the consequences of freedom and restriction

are more remote and less visible to where they most directly affect the ultimate

values. And we cannot think of better words to conclude than those of Wil-

helm von Humboldt which a hundred years ago John Stuart Mill put in front

of his essay On Liberty: “The grand, leading principle, towards which every

argument hitherto unfolded in these pages directly converges, is the absolute

and essential importance of human development in its richest diversity.” 19

 Constitution of liberty - Hayek